Tool Centricity: You Are Not Your Slide Deck
Maligned by some, venerated by others, PowerPoint has become etched into organizational cultures as a method to share information. The culture that has grown around the usage of PowerPoint is a case study in the pitfalls of organizations becoming centered on the tool versus the content it conveys. The medium is defining the message, forcing all presentations in a specific mold and in doing so often diluting analysis and limiting the utility of presented information. The lessons learned from the usage of and ongoing backlash against PowerPoint in the government sphere are important to any organization seeking to present and analyze information effectively.
The recent report on intelligence in Afghanistan, distributed through the Center for New American Security spends time discussing the problem of intelligence analysis, sharing, and presentation in the Afghanistan conflict. Part of this discussion is a critique of organizational expectations regarding PowerPoint as the preferred format for information sharing and analysis. "The format of intelligence products matters. Commanders who think PowerPoint storyboards and color-coded spreadsheets are adequate for describing the Afghan conflict and its complexities have some soul searching to do. Sufficient knowledge will not come from slides with little more text than a comic strip."
Circumventing DoD hierarchy, the report was delivered publicly and tapped into a long running online conversation on the place PowerPoint has come to occupy within many organizations.
In a recent iteration of this conversation, defense analyst Jason Sigger notes that PowerPoint is a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. In Sigger's mind, PowerPoint still has a role in the organizational, specifically military, realm. That role, however, is that of supporting more robust and thoughtful analysis. "We need our leaders to question the shiny graphs and flashy arrows, to force the staff officers to think it through, develop the data, come to supportable conclusions, write the report out. And THEN you do the powerpoint... .”
As both the report and Sigger's critique suggest, the issue of unnecessarily stymied information flows is organizationally rooted. A case of a tool being applied to processes without thought to whether those processes were effective to begin with. Through the actions of an organization, in this case the Department of Defense, the tool itself has become locked into a position of perceived necessity and, more disconcertingly, unquestioned expertise. Information delivered in slide format is taken as fact. Too often without thought given to information not on the slide or necessary questions asked about why the content on the slide was chosen. Presentations are given in PowerPoint, therefore a good slide deck is a good presentation regardless of content. How then, should the challenge of effectively analyzing and presenting data be addressed?
Edward Tufte, noted statistician and Yale professor, addresses this question in his analysis of mishandling of information as a contributing factor in the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. His concerns center on the organizationally driven need to streamline information in order to fit the PowerPoint format and the severe repercussions such actions can have in decision making. Tufte also highlights a significant issue in knowledge management at NASA, describing important discussions taking place between lower level engineers while high level briefs were occurring. Discussions that ultimately were unnoticed due to the role that certain presentation styles had been allowed to assume.
Tufte argues that "Serious problems require a serious tool: written reports. ... Of course full-screen projected images and videos are necessary; that is the one harmless use of PP. Meetings should center on precisely written reports on paper, not fragmented, bulleted talking points projected up on the wall." This evaluation of PowerPoint is nothing new for Tufte. In a 2003 piece for Wired magazine he notes that "Presentations largely stand or fall on the quality, relevance, and integrity of the content. If your numbers are boring, then you've got the wrong numbers. If your words or images are not on point, making them dance in color won't make them relevant." Tufte brings the case against the popular use of PowerPoint back to a very fundamental question. What constitutes relevant content? The answer to such a question is not universal, rather, it can only be defined by the context in which a presentation is given.
The issue of knowledge management, and especially effective presentation of information, is complex. Institutionalization of PowerPoint has inadvertently come to hobble the discussions that organizations sought to enhance through its use. Organizational behaviors that dissuade effective analysis and presentation have become enforced, expertise distilled, and critical points missed. The above critiques of the culture surrounding PowerPoint are, as already stated, not an indictment of the software nor an indictment solely of the organizations examined. Rather, they are a case study in how organizations – government, private, military, or otherwise – ought not approach a tool.
Through thoughtful application in the appropriate context, technology can go a long way to contributing to the effectiveness of how an organization operates. How then should an organization begin to take on the challenge of effectively presenting and sharing information? Organizations ought to first consider their own practices by evaluating how information is handled. Is information shared a certain way because that's the most effective method, or because “that's how it's always been done”? The information itself ought to also be considered. To whom is it being presented? What format well help convey information in a meaningful manner? Is it visual, statistical, or an analysis piece requiring more than bullet points? Effective selection and use of an information sharing tool can happen only after questions such as these have been addressed.

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Microsoft Helps Army Avoid ‘Death by PowerPoint’
In a recent wired article, Spencer Ackerman provides an update on the ongoing struggle with PowerPoint, focusing on the work being done by Dave Karle, an Executive Communications Manager at Mircrosoft, and the founder of the Modern Presenter blog. In short, attention is being turned away from the software itself, and more toward the usage patterns that have grown up around it. In response to the growing backlash against PowerPoint culture, Karle has chosen to focus on teaching presentation methods, including how to pick the right tool for the job.
While I think this is absolutely the approach to take, the thought of implementing it is daunting to say the least. Nevertheless, Karle has got the eye of the Combined Arms Center, and as such has an opportunity to introduce these methods to a broad audience. It's encouraging to see consideration being given to the 'how' of presenting information, but the real challenge will be how well this new approach survives the rigors of the bureaucratic process as it filters down through the ranks.
Next Slide, Please -- More on PowerPoint
Back in April, a swarm of publicity over the role of PowerPoint in military operations resulted from a NY Times article, illustrated with a spaghetti-bowl visualization of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. It stuck a chord as 700 people commented on the article.
But, the discussion hasn't stopped there.
More recently, Lawrence Sellin, a reservist Army Colonel serving as a staff officer for the International Security Assistance Force, wrote a cheeky opinion piece in August that skewers the command bureaucracy and its reliance on PowerPoint slide decks.
He probably has valid criticisms of how the command functions and where there could be improvements, but he burned a few bridges by writing passages like, "For headquarters staff, war consists largely of the endless tinkering with PowerPoint slides to conform with the idiosyncrasies of cognitively challenged generals in order to spoon-feed them information."
It's not surprising that Wired's Danger Room reported his firing three days later.
With more tact, perhaps he would have kept his job, but he claims critiques sent up the chain of command did not result in changes.
Yet, the key issues remain -- how best to understand and communicate complex topics? How should the organization change and adapt its culture of info sharing and incentives involved with the current process?
It's something the Army continues to discuss PowerPoint's role as Wired reported again as part of their coverage of the Unified Quest process that looks to the future and recommends ways to improve the organization.
Hopefully it will yield some outcomes as the future missions will not be any more simple.
What do you think? Post your updates below -- or just send me your slides :-)